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KAHN V. SHEVIN AND THE "HEIGHTENED
RATIONALITY TEST": IS THE SUPREME COURT
PROMOTING A DOUBLE STANDARD IN SEX
DISCRIMINATION CASES?
Statutes containing sex-based classifications have been challenged with increasing frequency in recent years, most often on the
ground that legislation which discriminates on the basis of sex vio-1
lates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Courts ruling on the constitutionality of such laws have encountered
great difficulty in determining the applicable standard of judicial
review 2 because the United States Supreme Court, in its decisions on
equal protection and sex discrimination, has failed to provide the
trial courts with an unambiguous and workable standard. In Kahn
v. Shevin,3 the major sex discrimination case of the Supreme Court's
1974 term,' the Court upheld a sex-based statutory classification by
See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For earlier decisions see Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (decided on the privileges and immunities clause as well).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been applied to
provisions which discriminate on the basis of sex through the use of the same analytic
processes employed in applying the equal protection clause. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Because the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal government,
challenges to discriminatory federal laws are brought under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, again using equal protection analysis. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954); District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909); see Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 533 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Wiesenfeld v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), argued,43 U.S.L.W.
3414 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 73-1892).
1 For a full discussion of equal protection theory and standards of review see text
accompanying notes 8-21 infra.
3 416 U.S. 351 (1974), aff'g 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973).
I Two other significant sex discrimination cases, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), were recently
decided by the Supreme Court. Because neither of these cases was decided upon a
theory which bears directly on the issues discussed in this article, these cases will be
considered only briefly.
In LaFleurthe Court struck down mandatory maternity leave regulations promulgated by several public school boards. Using the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court held such regulations to be an unconstitutional infringement
upon a female teacher's fundamental right to bear children. 414 U.S. at 648.
At issue in Aiello was California's disability insurance program which exempted
from coverage any work loss resulting from normal pregnancy. A majority of the Court,
applying the equal protection clause, upheld this legislative plan on the basis that the
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which Florida granted a property tax exemption to widows, but not
to widowers. The result in this case not only appeared to be inconsistent with two earlier cases in which similar sex-based classifications
were invalidated, Reed v. Reed5 and Frontiero v. Richardson,' but
also exacerbated existing 6onfusion over the proper standard of equal
protection review to be applied to such classifications. A close reading
of Kahn, Frontiero,and Reed reveals, however, that the Court did not
uphold the statutory classification at issue in Kahn because it applied a less exacting standard of review than that used to invalidate
sex-based classifications in Reed and Frontiero. Rather, the Court
seemingly applied a consistent standard of review in all three cases,
and the inconsistent results must be explained by examining the
theories upon which the Supreme Court differentiated the facts of
Kahn from those of Reed and Frontiero.
In reviewing discriminatory legislation under the equal protection
clause, the courts must resolve a crucial issue: which standard of
review is to be applied in determining whether the statute in question
violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights.7 The Supreme Court has,
since the Warren Court era, generally applied a "two-tiered" test in
analyzing equal protection problems.' Most challenged statutes, particularly those which regulate a state's social and economic matters,
occupy the "lower tier" and are judged by a lenient standard of
review. Under this standard, legislation is upheld unless the challenging plaintiff can establish that there exists no "rational basis" for the
determination. 9 However, when a statute restricts a "fundamental
exclusion was not based upon sex, but upon a physical condition. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
However, Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence in LaFleur was based upon equal
protection analysis, 414 U.S. at 651, and the dissent in Aiello analyzed the challenged
provision as one which discriminated on the basis of sex, not on the basis of a "neutral"
physical characteristic. 417 U.S. at 497.
1 404 U.S. 71 (1971), rev'g 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970). For a full discussion
of this case see text accompanying notes 22-31 infra.
6 411 U.S. 677 (1973), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972). For a full discussion
of this case see text accompanying notes 39-50 infra.
7 For a general discussion of equal protection law see Gunther, Forward:In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model for A Newer Equal Protection,86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
Gunther, supra note 7, at 8.

See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (variations in welfare benefits to those in different relief categories); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971)
(reduction in social security benefits to those who receive workman's compensation);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (maximum welfare grant regulation).
In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S- 420 (1961), which involved Sunday closing
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right"' 0 or is based upon a "suspect classification,"" it rests upon the
"higher tier" and must be examined under the "strict scrutiny" standard. Under this standard a defendant must demonstrate not only
that the law is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest, but also that it promotes that interest in the manner least
offensive to individual rights.'" The Court's application of this twotiered test has led to quite predictable results in most cases since the
choice of the proper test to apply has been determinative of the outcome. Indeed, during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, no statute
containing a suspect classification or restricting a fundamental right
satisfied the compelling state interest test, and no statute was ever
3
overturned when the Court used the rational basis test.'
A number of courts and commentators have speculated that the
Court under Chief Justice Burger is developing a "newer" equal protection standard of review to replace or augment the two-tiered test.'4
According to these observers, language in a number of equal protection cases recently decided by the Supreme Court indicates that the
Court reviewed the legislation challenged in those cases with a "graduated, sliding-scale test,"' 5 more flexible than the somewhat rigid
laws, the Court gave effect to the rational basis test by stating that "[a] statutory
discrimination will not be set aside-if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
1 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
" See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religion).
12 See cases cited in notes 10-11 supra.
,3 "[S]crutiny that was 'strict' in theory [was] fatal in fact. . . . [and] minimal scrutiny in theory [was] virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note 7, at 8. In
speaking of the strict scrutiny test, Chief Justice Burger commented that "no state law
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 363 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
" The Second Circuit in particular has noted and followed the "new" standard
of equal protection. Bridgeport Guard, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1973); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973); accord,
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1974); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, 145 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973). But
see, Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), argued, 43
U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.W. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 73-1892).
For discussion of this newly perceived standard see Gunther, supra note 7, at 8;
Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection,58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
1 City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1973). Another
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two-tiered test. This test, as perceived by one lower court, considers
the "nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of
the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in
support of it [to decide whether the] classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute."'" Although the Court has
not applied the test with the frequency necessary for a definitive
assessment of how it may replace or complement the two-tiered test,
a tentative pattern of use may be emerging. The intermediate test
does not seem to have been applied to statutory schemes which would
ordinarily have triggered the strict scrutiny test. 7 Rather, the Court
seems on occasion to have used the more rigorous "heightened rationality" test in place of the traditionally lenient rational basis standard."8 If a more rigorous intermediate test is indeed emerging in this
form, it may enable the Supreme Court not only to justify selective
use of the equal protection clause as an interventionist tool, but also
to avoid further expansion of the effective, but somewhat inflexible
compelling state interest test. 9
One of the cases in which the intermediate standard is generally
thought to have been applied was Reed v.Reed, 0 a 1971 decision
which marked a significant change in the Supreme Court's view of
the constitutionality of sex discrimination." Reed was the first case
example of this newer approach is seen in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where
the Court examined an Illinois statute under which the children of unwed parents
automatically became wards of the state upon the death of the mother. Under this
statutory scheme the unwed father, unlike the child's other relatives, was presumed
to be an unfit parent and had no opportunity for a hearing on the merits. Although
the Court acknowledged that the "establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to
achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication," id. at 656, and admitted the possibility that "most unmarried
fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents," id. at 654, it stated that "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency," and held that the statute
violated the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 656-57. See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1
(1974). See also cases cited in note 14 supra.
'7 For further discussion of this point see Gunther, supra note 7, at 12.
" See cases cited at note 10 supra.
" See Gunther, supra note 7, at 12.
404 U.S. 71 (1971), rev'g 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), noted in, e.g., 43
Miss. L. REv. 418 (1972); 2 TEXAS So. U. L. REv. 329 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REv. 412
(1972); 1972 Wis. L. REV. 626.
21 Before Reed, the Supreme Court had consistently upheld the constitutionality
of statutes which differentiated in their treatment of the sexes. Most of the legislation
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in which a statute discriminating on the basis of sex was held by the
Supreme Court to be violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.2 2 At issue in Reed was an Idaho law which
specified certain priorities among classes of persons who could qualify
as administrators of estates.Y The statutory scheme mandated that
when a probate court was faced with competing applications "[o]f
several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males
,,2
must be preferred to females ....
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote for a unanimous Court, observed
that legislation requiring different treatment of persons solely on the
basis of sex "establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause." The Chief Justice noted that while states
could legitimately treat various classes of persons in different ways,
the classifications must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, but "must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation ....
,,21 The Court concluded
sustained was characterized by the Court as protective legislation. For example, in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), the Supreme Court upheld a statute
prohibiting women from practicing law in Illinois, asserting that:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
...The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
A later case, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), established the principle that
women can properly be placed in a class by themselves and that "legislation designed
for [their] protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for men and could not be sustained." Id. at 422 (upholding statute restricting women's
working hours). See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding statute excluding women from jury list unless they applied); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (prohibiting women bartenders).
22 Prior to Reed, several state and federal district courts had overturned sex discriminatory statutes. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn.
1968) (sentencing disparities invalidated); Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F.
Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (loss of consortium damages not limited to husbands);
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (statute
forbidding women to be bartenders invalid because sex is a suspect classification).
2 IDAHO CODE §15-312 (1948) (repealed 1971) provided that administration of the
estate of a person dying intestate must be granted to certain classes of persons in a
particular order of preference. For example, a surviving husband or wife was to be
preferred over surviving children, the children over the father or mother, the father and
mother over the brothers and sisters, and so on.
2' IDAHO CODE §15-314 (1948) (repealed 1971).
2 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
25Id. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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that although the state's objective of streamlining probate court proceedings was not without some legitimacy, 1 "[t]o give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
[was] to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",,
Because the Court declared the sex-based classification in Reed
to be violative of the equal protection clause without declaring all
sex-based classifications to be suspect,29 and because the Court
reached this conclusion using language characteristic of both the
strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test,3" a clear standard for
judging such classifications did not emerge from the case. It did seem
clear, however, that in Reed the Supreme Court took a significant
step toward altering a century-old policy of consistently upholding
legislation which discriminated on the basis of sex.
State and federal trial courts faced with multiplying sex discrimination challenges under the equal protection clause noted the Reed
decision immediately. Many courts agreed that "[w]hat emerges
[from Reed] is an 'intermediate approach' between rational basis
and compelling interest as a test of validity under the equal protection clause."' "Operating upon a special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor, '32 these courts reached the same result as had the Su-3
preme Court in Reed, and in turn invalidated challenged legislation.1
2 Id. at 76. If the traditional rational basis test had been applied in Reed, "some
legitimacy" would have been sufficient to sustain the discriminatory statutes. See
notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
404 U.S. at 76.
' See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
In analyzing the statute challenged in Reed the Court used a confusing assortment of phrases and catch-words. Chief Justice Burger's "subject to scrutiny" language, 404 U.S. at 75, is usually associated with application of the strict scrutiny
standard. The Court's framing of the issue as "whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants . . . bears a rational relationship to a state objective," id. at 76,
is characteristic of the minimal scrutiny test. The "fair and substantial relation"
language, id. at 76, seems to fall somewhere in between.
3' Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973); accord, Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375
F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
rev'd, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
32 Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1l,19, 1133 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
The rationale for overturning statutes containing sex-based classifications on
the authority of Reed was expressed by a lower court judge in Samuel v. University of
Pittsburgh:
The result, and the reasoning employed to reach that result . . . are
entirely consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in . . .
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On the other hand, some courts insisted that in Reed the Supreme
Court had applied the traditional minimal scrutiny test. Yet many
of these courts, purportedly applying this lenient standard, nevertheless overturned statutes which discriminated on the basis of sex34 if
they found "justification for the discrimination lacking"3 or if the
provisions were "arbitrary," "irrational," or based on "generalities
and stereotypes contrary to the requirements of the equal protection
clause." 36 Although this broad application of Reed by the lower courts
was by no means universal, 3 an examination of cases decided subsequent to Reed shows the willingness of many state and federal judges
to apply the equal protection clause with new force to statutes which
discriminated on the basis of sex. Whether trial judges felt bound by
Reed or whether they agreed with the decision as a policy statement
on sex discrimination, they began to assert that "[s]exual stereo'3
types [were] no less invidious than racial or religious ones.
The next major sex discrimination case decided by the Supreme
Court was Frontiero v. Richardson,39 in which a plurality" of the
Reed v. Reed, . . . perhaps the foremost example of the application
of the more rigorous rational basis test which avoids the labeling of
sex as a suspect criterion ....
Id. at 1133.
31See, e.g., Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 906 (1973) (overturned a sex-based classification of the Internal Revenue
Code); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Ore. 1974) (held
unconstitutional the refusal of school board to allow female teacher use of sick leave
for pregnancy disability); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) (held unconstitutional a mandatory maternity leave policy); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972) (enjoined defendant
from prohibiting female students from participating on golf team); Williams v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (held unconstitutional a mandatory maternity leave regulation).
11Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 906 (1973).
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (D. Ore. 1974).
See, e.g., Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973) (upheld mandatory maternity leave); Bucha
v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (upheld limitations on
girl's athletic contests); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973) (upheld
jury exemption available to women only).
Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
411 U.S. 677 (1973), rev'g 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972), noted in, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HIv.L. REV. 1, 116-25 (1973); 10 GA. S.B.J. 493 (1974);
51 J. OF URBAN L. 535 (1974); 59 IowA L. Rav. 377 (1973); 5 RUraRS CAMDEN L.J. 348
(1974); 5 LOYOLA (CH.) U.L.J. 295 (1974).
11Mr. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality in Frontiero and was joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall.
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Court held sex to be a suspect classification." The question before the
Court in that case was whether a female member of the uniformed
services had a right to claim her spouse as a dependent for the purpose of obtaining increased housing allowances and medical benefits
on an equal basis with male personnel. The statutory scheme in question42 allowed a serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent regardless of her actual dependency, but provided that a servicewoman
could not claim her husband as a dependent unless she could show
that he was, in fact, dependent upon her for more than half of his
support.
The plurality found the government's justification for this statutory differential, that it promoted administrative efficiency, failed to
saftisfy the compelling state interest test. In support of the decision
to apply strict scrutiny,43 Mr. Justice Brennan detailed the "long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination"44 and concluded that "sex,
like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . . [and] bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society." 45 The plurality also
pointed out that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional under the
41 For a discussion of the significance of declaring sex to be a suspect classification,
see notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
42 10 U.S.C. §§1072, 1076 (1970); 37 U.S.C. §§401, 403 (1970).
43 The plurality found "at least implicit support for such an approach.
. . in Reed
v. Reed," and cited the "subject to scrutiny" language of the case as authority. 411
U.S. at 682-83. The four Justices also recognized that while Reed did not go so far as
to deem sex a suspect classification, its analysis was a "departure from 'traditional'
rational-basis analysis with respect to sex-based classifications." Id. at 684.
The Court also noted that Congress itself, as evidenced by its passage of such
legislation as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and
the Equal Rights Amendment, "has concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration." Id. at 687-88.
" Id. at 684. The plurality found that this sex discrimination "was rationalized
by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on
a pedestal, but in a cage." Id.
Significantly, the plurality seemed to diffentiate the statutes challenged in
Frontierofrom legislation "designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women," and cited with apparent approval Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). 411 U.S. at 689 n.22. In Gruenwald the Second
Circuit upheld a social security regulation which allowed women workers to receive full
benefits at the age of 62, but allowed men to collect these benefits only after reaching
the age of 65. The Gruenwald court cited Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) and
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), see note 21 supra, as authority for the proposition that "special recognition and favored treatment can constitutionally be afforded
women." 390 F. 2d at 592.
,5 411 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted).
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Reed test alone, since the legislation mandated dissimilar treatment
for similarly situated men and women solely for administrative convenience."
In a concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice Powell,4" three
members of the Court agreed with the majority that the statutes
attacked in Frontierofailed to satisfy the requirements of the equal
protection clause. 8 However, the concurring Justices considered it
unnecessary as well as injudicious to designate sex a suspect classification since the case could be correctly decided under the Reed standard. 9 Thus, while only four Justices held 8ex-based classifications
to be suspect, there was a clear consensus that the statutory scheme
challenged in Frontierowas as violative of the equal protection clause
as the legislation declared unconstitutional in Reed.
The Frontierodecision seemed to reinforce the increasing use of a
stricter standard by trail courts evaluating legislation which discriminated on the basis of sex. Although only a plurality of the Court had
declared unequivocally that sex classifications were constitutionally
suspect, many lower courts subsequently agreed that "sex is a suspect
classification which must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny."5
'

The Court stated:

[Tihe statutes operate so as to deny benefits to a female member [of
the uniformed services] . . . who provides less than one-half her

spouse's support, while at the same time granting such benefits to a
male member who likewise provides less than one-half his spouse's
support. Thus, to this extent at least, it may fairly be said that these
statutes command "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are
... similarly situated."
Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
11Joining in Mr. Justice Powell's opinion were Chief Justice Burger and Mr.
Justice Blackmun.
"' Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurring opinion, and stated only that
the statute worked an "invidious discrimination." Id. at 691. This phrase, although at
times used in conjunction with the strict scrutiny test, pre-dates the use of the twotiered test and cannot be interpreted to be the equivalent of holding sex to be a suspect
classification. Rather, it is only a determination that in the instant case, the statute
invidiously discriminated against the particular plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented, relying upon the traditional rational basis test
as applied by the district court. Id., referring to Reed v. Reed, 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972).
1 The concurring opinion said that since Reed was sufficient authority upon
which to decide this case, "[iut is unnecessary ... to characterize sex as a suspect
classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding." 411 U.S. at
691-92. Those that concurred also believed that for the Court to decide the very issue
which the equal rights amendment would resolve if adopted would be to "pre-empt
by judicial action a major political decision." Id. at 692.
10Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 442 (E.D. Pa.
1973); accord, Johnson v. Hodges, F. Supp. -, 42 U.S.L.W. 2509 (E.D. Ky.,
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Some courts continued to test discriminatory statutes with traditional minimal scrutiny, which usually resulted in the validation of
the statutes. 5' But a number of provisions containing sex-based classifications were overturned by trial courts even when the strict scrutiny test was not applied. In these cases, the judges apparently concluded that although a majority of the Supreme Court had not clearly
espoused the compelling state interest test in Reed and Frontiero,it
had nevertheless used a test which required a greater showing of a
legitimate state interest than that required under the traditional lenient rational basis test."2
A survey of post-Frontierocases thus indicates that a great many
trial courts, either by espousing the strict scrutiny test of the
Frontiero plurality, 3 or by adopting an intermediate test extracted
54
from Reed and Frontiero,
had clearly rejected the once-perfunctory
approval of statutes which discriminated on the basis of sex. Even
those courts that resisted the abandonment of the minimal scrutiny
standard in sex discrimination cases no longer relied upon pre-Reed
cases for support. 55 Several courts and commentators, however, recognized that although the Supreme Court had strongly condemned sex
discrimination in Reed and Frontiero, it had by no means clarified
the legal theories by which this policy was to be implemented or the
equal protection standards by which sex-based statutory classifications should be measured." As one federal judge expressed the dilemma:
At best, all that can be gleaned from Reed and Frontierois
March 25, 1974); Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. 1l. 1974); Andrews v.
Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Wiesenfeld
v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S.
Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 73-1892); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1974);
Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1973).
"' See, e.g., Crawford v. Cushman,__ F. Supp. -,
43 U.S.L.W. 2053 (D. Vt.,
July 12, 1974); United States v. Offord, __
F. Supp. -,
42 U.S.L.W. 2485 (E.D.
Wis., March 7, 1974); Sumpter v. State, Ind. , 306 N.E.2d 95 (1974); Warshafsky v. Journal Co., 63 Wis. 2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974); People v. McCalvin,
55 Ill. 2d 161, 302 N.E.2d 342 (1973).
512See, e.g., United States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Smith
v. Keator, 21 N.C. App. 102, 203 S.E.2d 411, affd, N.C. -, 206 S.E.2d 203
(1974).
5 See cases cited in note 50 supra.
' See cases cited in note 52 supra.
s See cases cited in note 51 supra.
s See, e.g., Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973),
argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 73-1892); Comment, Frontierov.
Richardson, 51 J. OF URBAN L. 535, 541 (1974).

1975]

KAHN V. SHEVIN

that until the Supreme Court is faced squarely with the problem of extending Reed in a case where a sexual classification
could be validly upheld under the "traditional" test but not
under "close judicial scrutiny," we cannot be absolutely certain how statutory sex discrimination fits within equal protection doctrine. 5
It was in this milieu that the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Kahn v. Shevin.5 8
Challenged in Kahn v. Shevin was a Florida statute59 which
granted an annual $500 property tax exemption to all widows who
applied for the exemption. Melvin Kahn, a widower, applied for and
was denied this exemption solely because the statute offered no analogous benefit to widowers. A state circuit court invalidated the statutory scheme on the ground that the statute's sex-based classification
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed,60 however, finding that the statute had a fair and substantial relation to the stated legislative goal,"'
which was "the reduction of the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman.""2 A majority of the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court's holding.
A terse majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, 3 appar11Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973), argued,
43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 73-1892).
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
51The statute provided that:

Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow,
blind person, or totally and permanently disabled person who is a
bona fide resident of this state shall be exempt from taxation.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §196.202 (1971) formerly §196.191(2).
1*Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973).
61Id. at 73, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
62 Id.
13Joining in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas,
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. It was not unexpected that Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist refused to categorize sex as a
suspect classification in Kahn, where a man complained of being discriminated
against. In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), these Justices
defined the traditional indicia of suspectness in a way which would clearly not apply
to the position of men in American society:
[Tihe class is ... saddled with such disabilities or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Id. at 28. Professor Ginsberg, a noted commentator in the field of sex discrimination
law, made a similar observation:
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ently applied the Reed intermediate test and approved Florida's use
of the sex differential in the disputed tax provision because it rested
upon "some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 4 Frontierowas cursorily distinguished on the basis that it concerned the constitutionality of benefits granted to males and denied to females, solely for administrative
convenience." The Court emphasized that because the statute at
issue in Kahn was a state tax law "reasonably designed to further the
state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon
the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden,""0 it did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Significantly, the majority resurrected a 1908 case 7
which had established the principle that women may properly be
placed in a class by themselves, and cited the fact that Congress had
not yet drafted women for military service to support the contention
that "[g]ender has never been rejected as an impermissable classification in all instances.""8
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a dissenting opinion in
Kahn 9 and, consistent with their holding in Frontiero,reiterated that
sex-based legislative classifications should be subjected to close judiSuspect classification . . . relates to the group that has borne the
stigma of inferiority or second class treatment; it has not been used
to shield the culture's dominant group from discrimination.
Ginsberg, Sex and UnequalProtection:Men and Women as Victims, 11 J. FAM.L. 347,
361-62 (1972) (footnote omitted).
However, several lower courts have decided that men, as well as women, can be
adversely affected by sex-based classifications. See Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643,
647 (S.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975) (No. 73-776) (irrelevant whether the discriminatory impact favors the female or the male); Moritz v.
Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973); Lamb
v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.
La. 1973), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 73-759).
64 416 U.S. at 355, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
'5 Id. The test which Mr. Justice Douglas applied to the sex-based classification
in Kahn is apparently inconsistent with his holding in Frontierothat sex is a suspect
classification which must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1972). See also note 88 infra.
66 416 U.S. at 355.
67 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), abstractedat note 21 supra.
416 U.S. at 356 n.10. A plurality of the Court in Frontiero, which included Mr.
Justice Douglas, intimated that not all sex-based classifications would be considered
suspect when it noted that the statutes challenged in Frontierowere "not in any sense
designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against women" and cited with
apparent approval Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
982 (1968), discussed at note 44 supra. 411 U.S. at 689 n.22.
69 416 U.S. at 357.
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cial scrutiny.70 From this premise, however, they reached the atypical
conclusion 7' that because the sex-based classification served a remedial purpose,7 it could be deemed necessary to the achievement of a
compelling state interest.73 Elaborating on their reasoning, the dissenters asserted:
[Tihe purpose and effect of the suspect classification are
ameliorative; the statute neither stigmatizes nor denigrates
widowers not also benefitted by the legislation. Moreover, inclusion of needy widowers within the class of beneficiaries
would not further the State's overriding interest in remedying
the economic effects of past 4sex discrimination for needy vic7
tims of that discrimination.
This language indicates that Justices Brennan and Marshall considered the Florida tax benefit scheme invalid only because it was so
broadly drafted that it included women who did not need its benefits,7 5 and not because it discriminated unfairly against men who did.
Thus, but for the dissent's objection that the statute was not carefully
drawn, the reasoning of the majority and that of the dissent are
essentially reconcilable. Either explicitly or implicitly, all but one of
the Justices70 gave their imprimatur to what may be termed a "be7 Id.
": See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of why the result
reached by the dissent was not characteristic of the use of the strict scrutiny test.
7 It is questionable whether the Court examined with more than perfunctory care
Florida's justification for the statutory sex differential. If Florida were genuinely concerned with economic discrimination against women, its anti-discrimination laws
would certainly have forbidden gender-based discrimination. However, several such
laws did not include gender as a prohibited classification. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§409.026,
509.092, 590.141 (1970). Reply Brief for Appellant at 4 n.8, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974). Another declared purpose of the tax exemption, not discussed by the Court,
was that it was to encourage the elderly to retire in the state. Reply Brief for Appellant
at 7, citing Brief for Appellees at 25.
,1 416 U.S. at 358.
7' Id. at 358, 360.
75Id.

"1Mr. Justice White, who agreed in Frontierothat sex was a suspect classification,
rendered a separate dissent in Kahn. Id. at 360. He found merit in extending a tax
benefit to widows, but maintained that "gender-based classifications are suspect and
require more justification than the state has offered." Id. at 361. Mr. Justice White
rejected the state's contention, relied upon by the majority and the other dissent, that
the statute's purpose was to compensate for past discrimination. If that were indeed
the purpose, he pointed out, the exemption should neither be limited to women who
were widows nor ignore all those widowers who had felt the effects of economic discrimination because of racial or social disadvantages. Id. at 361-62.
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nign classification" theory, whereby statutory classifications which
otherwise would fail under the strict or the heightened rationality
standard of review, will survive equal protection scrutiny if discriminatory only in ways determined by the Court to be ameliorative.
In attempting to understand how the Court justified this result in
Kahn without overruling Reed and Frontiero,it is important to examine carefully the theories upon which the cases were distinguished.
Both the majority and the Brennan-Marshall dissent narrowly construed Reed and Frontiero, stating that those cases dealt only with
statutory discrimination against women for which the sole justification was administrative efficiency. The legislation attacked in Kahn
was characterized not as discriminating against anyone, but as extending a remedial benefit to a gender-defined class, the members of
which had suffered previous economic discrimination. Although the
Court did not specifically acknowledge its use of this "benign classification" theory, it must nevertheless be considered central to the
Kahn decision. The majority opinion also found significant the fact
that the challenged statute was a tax statute, and used this characterization to further justify the result. This "taxing" theory must also
be examined to understand fully the implications of Kahn.
When analyzed closely, the taxation theory advanced by the majority77 appears to be nothing more than a smokescreen with which
the Court avoided thorough discussion of the primary issue in the
case, the constitutional validity of so-called benign classifications
based upon sex. As the majority asserted, it seems well-established
that in taxation matters legislatures possess great freedom in classification." Thus, when testing taxing classifications, the Supreme
Court has consistently applied a very permissive standard of review,
requiring the party attacking the classification "to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it. ' 'T7 However, every case
cited by the Kahn majority to support this proposition dealt with a
taxing classification which could have been appropriately tested by
the lenient rational basis test even had it not been in a tax statute."0
11416

U.S. at 355.
Id., citing, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
11309 U.S. at 88.
60416 U.S. at 355, 356 n.9, citing, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973) (classification based on whether taxpayer was a corporation or individual); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (classification based on state residency); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (classification based on whether bank
deposits were in state or out of state); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276
(1932) (classification based on whether taxpayer was a corporation or individual);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (classification based on whether
71
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Therefore it cannot be inferred from these precedents that the mere
characterization of legislation as tax-related can in itself legitimatize
the statute's classification system or warrant its review under a lenient test, unless the classification could be appropriately reviewed by
that standard in any statutory context. In short, the taxing rationale
does not seem to be a sufficient basis upon which the Kahn Court
could logically distinguish the facts or results in Reed and Frontiero.
Therefore, the result in Kahn must be justified, if indeed it can be
justified, by the benign classification theory tacitly advanced by the
Court.
Although the Court used the benign classification rationale in
Kahn without discussing its theoretical underpinnings, that theory is
of logical necessity predicated upon two premises, only one of which
was made explicit in the opinion. The first premise is that the class
benefitted by the statutory scheme, in this case widows, is one which
has been historically discriminated against.5 ' This premise was explicitly set forth in both Frontiero and Kahn, where the Court detailed the legal, social, and economic disabilities suffered by American women and took judicial notice of the extent to which they have
been injured by stereotypical role models embodied in discriminatory
legislation.' The second premise underlying the benign classification
theory is that the class which does not receive the benefit in question
has not been similarly discriminated against in the past, and is not
now discriminated against because it does not also receive the remedial benefit.0 This premise was never made explicit in Kahn but is
implicit in the result of the case. As in Reed and Frontiero,the "man
as breadwinner, woman as dependent" stereotype was the rationale
upon which the challenged statutory classification was based., That
business done in state or out of state); Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S.
232 (1890) (classification based upon value of certain bonds).
11 Even assuming that the Court was correct in its finding that widows have
suffered economic discrimination because of their sex, and that the purpose of the
statute was indeed to compensate for this discrimination, the statutory scheme was
seriously under-inclusive in that it excluded all single and divorced women who had
suffered the same economic discrimination as had widows. For a discussion of the effect
of the under- or over-exclusiveness of the legislative classification see Developments,
supra note 7, at 1082-87.
32 In Kahn, the majority took judicial notice of statistics which showed that
women working full time in 1972 had a median income of only 57.9% of the male
median income. 416 U.S. at 353. In Frontiero,the plurality detailed the "gross, stereotyped distinctions" common to many statutes, and recognized the extent to which
these statutes discriminated against women. 411 U.S. at 685. See also note 44 supra.
0 See note 63 supra.
94This stereotype was exhibited in Reed, in which the appellee, in addition to
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the Court viewed this stereotype as discriminatory in Reed and
Frontierobut not in Kahn can only be explained by the fact that the
plaintiffs in Reed and Frontiero were women, while in Kahn the
plaintiff was a man. Upon these underlying premises, then, the Court
characterized the Florida statute as one which extended a benefit to
women but did not discriminatorily deny a right to men, and was
thus not violative of the equal protection clause.
The Kahn Court's conclusion that the ameliorative purpose of the
Florida tax statute was sufficient to render an arguably unacceptable
classification permissible is without clear precedent in equal protection doctrine. The Supreme Court has impliedly tolerated racial classifications used to promote school desegregation," and several lower
federal courts have authorized these classifications in connection
with affirmative action plans as well as desegregation schemes. 7
However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly used a benign clasattempting to justify the stautory preference for male executors as promoting administrative efficiency, also argued that this preference was reasonable since "men [are]
as a rule more conversant with business affairs than . . . women." Brief for Appellee
at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), quoted in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 683 (1973). In Frontiero,the government maintained that "as an empirical matter,
wives in our society frequently are dependent upon their husbands, while husbands
rarely are dependent upon their wives." 411 U.S. at 689. The use of this stereotype in
the Florida tax statute challenged in Kahn is even more blatant because the statute
assumes that a woman left alone by the death of her husband is economically disabled
while a man is believed to suffer little financial loss upon the death of his wife, and
even to be relieved of the burden of supporting her. Brief for Appellant at 5, Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
81The characterization of the statute as extending a privilege but not creating a
right was not made explicit by the Kahn majority, but the Brennan-Marshall dissent
specifically found that the statute "neither stigmatizes nor denigrates widowers not
also benefited by the legislation." 416 U.S. at 359. However, this right-privilege dichotomy, if in fact relied upon by the Court in Kahn, has long been discredited in equal
protection doctrine. As recently as 1971 the Court "rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or
a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); accord, Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 1439 (1967).
86 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See
generally Developments, supra note 7, at 1104-15.
11See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 318 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractor's Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378
F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.N.J. 1970);
Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968).
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sification analysis to authorize "reverse discrimination" and, in fact,
avoided its most recent opportunity to consider the issue." Thus, if
a sex-based classification in Kahn was upheld because of its remedial
purpose, while indistinguishable classifications were invalidated in
Reed and Frontierobecause they could only be justified by administrative efficiency, the Court has chosen a rather casual manner of
announcing a significant, but unexplained, change in equal protection doctrine. 9
The Court's use of the benign classification theory to justify its
holding in Kahn was not only unprecedented in equal protection
doctrine, but was also contrary to governmental policy. Congress has
legislatively prohibited sex discrimination in many contexts" and has
U The Court's most recent opportunity to consider the issue of benign classifications was in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), a case which involved a
challenge to the University of Washington Law School's policy, of giving preferential
treatment to minority applicants. Because the plaintiff, a white applicant who was
rejected though his grades and test scores were superior to those of a number of
minority applicants admitted/had been admitted pursuant to a preliminary injunction
and was to graduate regardless of the outcome of the case, the Court dismissed the
case as moot. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion discussing the merits of
the case, however, in which he deemed benign racial classifications to be constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 320. For a more detailed discussion of Mr. Justice Douglas'
dissent in DeFunis see note 89 infra.
" Mr. Justice Douglas' position on this issue is particularly inexplicable. In
Frontierohe stated that sex-based classifications were suspect and must be tested with
strict judicial scrutiny, yet when confronted with the same classification in Kahn he
refused to apply the strict scrutiny test, apparently because the statute's classification
was benign. This inconsistency is compounded when Mr. Justice Douglas' position in
Kahn is compared with his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974).
In that case, which involved the benign use of the suspect classification of race, Mr.
Justice Douglas emphatically affirmed that the strict scrutiny test should be applied:
"A finding that the state school employed a racial classification in selecting its students subjects it to the strictest scrutiny." Id. at 333. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969). But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802 (1969).
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 forbid
discrimination on the basis of sex in the employment context and have been applied
on behalf of both men and women who have been discriminated against. See, e.g.,
R~osen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Hays v. Potlach
Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The Equal Employment
1
Opportunity Commission under the authority of this Act has, for example, found
unlawful a death benefit plan which provided an automatic pension to widows of male
employees,/but no pension for widowers of female employees unless they are incapable
of self-support. EEOC Decisions, Case No. YNY9-034, CCH EMP. PRAc. Gum, §6050
(1969). The equal rights amendment, passed in 1972, is an indication that Congress

/
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also taken action in recent years to remove the sex differential from
government benefit schemes." In Frontiero, the Court attached considerable significance to congressional policy. 2 The Court in Kahn,
however, inexplicably disregarded the conclusions of a coequal
branch of government.
As can be concluded from this analysis, Kahn v. Shevin is not a
well-reasoned or well-explained opinion. The taxing rationale suggested by the Court is misleading and the benign classification theory
seems contrary to established equal protection doctrine. Furthermore, even broad considerations of public policy do not provide
strong support for the Court's holding. By refusing to concede that
the statutory scheme challenged in Kahn discriminated against widowers, the entire Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice White,93
seemingly displayed a limited view of what constitutes sex discrimination. Moreover, the Court's failure to delve into the logical underpinnings and theoretical implications of its holding offered the lower
finds sex discrimination to be undesirable in virtually every legislative setting. For
comments on the equal rights amendment see Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal
Rights Amendment, 59 ABA J. 1013 (1973); Comment, Sex Discriminationand Equal
Protection:Do We Need A ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1499 (1971);
Equal Rights Amendment: A Symposium, Vol. 1, no. 2, HUMAN Rrs. 54 (1971).
11Congress amended the provisions of a federal employee benefit plan in 1971 to
equalize the tests for payment of death benefits to widows and widowers of federal
employees. Previously, widowers were entitled to such benefits only if they were wholly
dependent upon their wives, while widows were entitled to such benefits if they were
merely living with their spouses. 5 U.S.C. §7152 (Supp. 111, 1973), amending 5 U.S.C.
§7152 (1970).
When Congress amended 5 U.S.C. §8341 (1970), which defines persons qualified
for Federal Civil Service survivors annuities, the House Committee Report stated the
following reasons for the amendment:
In the Committee's judgment, the present provision is discriminatory in that it runs counter to the facts of current-day living,
whereby the woman's earnings are significant in supporting the family
and maintaining its standard of living. Accordingly, the bill removes
the dependency requirements applicable to surviving widowers of female employees, thus according them the same treatment accorded widows of deceased male employees.
H.R. REP. No. 1469, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1970). This report is contained in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5934. It is also interesting to note that Congress has
eliminated the sex differential from the social security regulations approved in Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968), and apparently sanctioned by the Court in Frontiero.411 U.S. at 689 n.22.42 U.S.C. §414 (Supp.
II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §414 (1970). See also note 44 supra; Brief for Appellant
at 19-21, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
92 See note 43 supra.
" Mr. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in Kahn which is abstracted at
note 76 supra.

19751

KAHN V. SHEVIN

courts little insight as to how Kahn, together with Reed and
Frontiero, established an equal protection standard appropriate for
review of sex-based statutory classifications.
In reading together these three cases to extract the appropriate
standard of equal protection review, the first and most obvious conclusion which must be drawn is that a majority of the Supreme Court
seems determined to use a standard less demanding than the strict
scrutiny test to examine sex-based statutory classifications. Equally
clear, however, is that those members of the Court do not consider
the traditional rational basis test the only alternative to the strict
scrutiny test. As the results in Reed and Frontieroindicate, a majority of the Court is prepared to find sex-based classifications unconstitutional under certain circumstances, and language common to all
three cases9 suggests that such classifications will be overturned if
they do not "rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."9 5 Although when
taken out of context this language could be construed as characteristic of the traditional rational basis test, the fact that in Reed and
Frontiero discriminatory statutes were found unconstitutional when
judged by this standard, even though the statutes were not without
some rational basis, suggests that the Court applied an intermediate,
heightened rationality test. It would thus seem improper for lower
courts to reason that because a majority of the Supreme Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test in Kahn, the Court has determined that the permissive rational basis test is appropriate for judging the validity of all sex-based classifications."
1,Reed, Frontiero, and Kahn all contain similar language, first used in Reed,
which evidences a stricter rationality test. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.'" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). "[Tjhese statutes command 'dissimilar
treatment for men and women who are ... similarly situated.'" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77. "Florida's differing
treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' "Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351, 355 (1974), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1970).
" See note 94 supra.
" That Kahn is susceptible to misinterpretation on this point is evidenced in
Edwards v. Schlesinger, 377 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1974), in which the trial court
stated, "the conclusion to be drawn from Kahn is that the Supreme Court has not
declared sex to be an inherently suspect classification .... Therefore, the rational

relationship test is the one properly to be applied [in this case]." Id. at 1096. Other
sex discrimination cases decided after Kahn have shown varying interpretations. See
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Lower courts attempting to apply a standard of equal protection
review which is consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Reed, Frontiero, and Kahn may find it difficult to apply the intermediate test employed in those cases. Had the Supreme Court used the
two-tiered approach, a definitive standard of review with quite predictable results would have been mandated for trial courts revieing
sex-based discriminatory legislation under the equal protection
clause. 7 However, the "fair and substantial relation" test used by the
Court in these cases, though not an unworkable standard, cannot be
applied with nearly the certainty or consistency of the two-tiered test.
Use of the intermediate test will require an inquiry into the legislative purpose of the statute in question, an investigation which may
often prove fruitless or misleading."' Trial judges will also have to
make unavoidably subjective judgments in deciding what constitutes
a "fair and substantial" relation to the purpose of the statute. Any
analysis of these factors is susceptible to considerable error and variation and it is, perhaps, the necessity of making these subjective
judgments that is the most serious drawback of this intermediate
standard of review. The Supreme Court found the sex-based classifications at issue in Reed and Frontiero to be unconstitutional under
this test, yet was able to rationalize the opposite result in Kahn.
However, a lower court using the same test and faced with an identical set of facts could logically find the sex-based classification to be
as invidiously discriminatory as the classifications in Reed and
Frontiero. Such a holding could be supported by the judge finding
that even benign sex-based classifications are based upon rigid sexual
stereotypes,"8 are contrary to public policy, 00 or represent the very
0
"romantic paternalism" so strongly condemned in Frontiero.1
' Although the Supreme Court failed to make such findings in its Kahn
opinion, it is nevertheless arguable that though the widows' tax benefit may have an immediate favorable effect for some women, in the
long run it would only serve to perpetuate the very concepts of stereotyped sex roles which caused the economic discrimination Florida
sought to alleviate by its widows' tax exemption. 02
Women's Liberation Union of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44 (D.R.I.
1974); Kohr v. Wienberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974); People v. Elliot, 525
P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. 1974).
'7

See note 13 supra.

See note 72 supra.
See note 84 supra.
'ooSee notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
"
"

'0'

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).

102Mr.

Justice Douglas, in his dissent to DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 322
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Kahn v. Shevin would have been a more enlightened decision had
the Supreme Court found the challenged legislation violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.103 If the Court
had reached this result by declaring sex to be a suspect classification
and using the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest test, a clear
and predictable standard for testing sex-based statutory classifications would have been established. However, the intermediate equal
protection test utilized in Kahn, and the result reached by the Court
in applying that standard, present serious problems of interpretation
for the lower courts. It can only be hoped that trial courts testing sexbased classifications with this "fair and substantial relation" test will
evidence greater sensitivity to the social and individual consequences
of sex discrimination than did the Supreme Court in Kahn. Courts
and legislators alike must become aware that legislation embodying
rigid sexual stereotypes can be just as unfair to men as to women and
that so-called benign sex-based classifications are just as unacceptable as clearly invidious classifications because both stem from stereotyped definitions of the proper role of men and women in society.10
HARRIET DICKINSON DORSEY
(1974), recognized the adverse psychological effect of granting such favors to those
previously discriminated against when he noted: "One other assumption must be
clearly disapproved that Blacks or Browns cannot make it on their individual merit."
Id. at 343.
"1 Once a court has held benefit conferring legislation to be unconstitutional, it
must decide whether the benefit should be extended to the excluded class or struck
down entirely. In order to make this decision the trial court must "decide whether it
more nearly accords with [the legislature's] wishes to eliminate its policy altogether
or extend it in order to render what [the legislature] plainly did intend, constitutional." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355-56 (1970); accord, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942); Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525, 531
(1969). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Hays v. Potlatch Forests,
Inc., 465 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1972); Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus.
Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
M"Since the Kahn decision was rendered, two subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have dealt with the issue of sex discrimination and equal protection. Taylor v. Louis282
La. -,
iana, 43 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975) (No. 73-5744), rev'g So. 2d 491 (1973); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 43 U.S.L.W. 4158 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975) (No.
73-776), rev'g 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973). In Taylor the Court, with only Mr.
Justice Rehnquist dissenting, found that a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial
was denied by a Louisiana law which did not include women on lists of those eligible
for jury duty unless they requested that their names be listed. The Court in Ballard,
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and White dissenting, upheld a statutory
scheme which granted female naval officers more advantageous discharge conditions
than male officers. That the Court upheld a sex discriminatory statute in Ballardwhile
overturning such a statute in Taylor illustrates the problems the Court is having in
reaching consistent results in these cases. In Taylor the Court managed to come to its
conclusion with very little discussion of the equal protection clause, but discussed the
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case in the context of the sixth amendment right of a criminal defendant to a jury trial.
In Ballard the fourteenth amendment issue was more directly confronted and the
majority found differing treatment of male and female officers was "completely rational." Yet the Court's long and thorough discussion of the government's justification for the disparity and its use of Reed, Frontiero,and Kahnfor its authority indicate
that the Court did not apply the rational basis test in its traditional manner. Thus,
these two decisions shed little light on the confusion created by the Court in Kah l and
reinforce the impression that a double standard in sex discrimination cases is evolving.
Resolution of the following cases, now pending before the Supreme Court, may
also bear upon the issue with which this article is concerned: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No.
73-1892) (social security provision which grants certain benefits to widows, not widowers); Edwards v. Healy, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1972), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3221
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1974), (No. 73-759) (jury service law which treats men and women
differently); Stanton v. Stanton, Utah. , 517 P.2d 1010 (1974), argued, 43
U.S.L.W, 3438 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 73-1461) (age of majority different for males
and females).
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